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ABSTRACT 
Decision support systems continue to be very popular in business, despite mixed research 
evidence as to their effectiveness. We hypothesize that what-if analysis, a prominent feature 
of most decision support systems, creates an “illusion of control” causing users to overestimate 
its effectiveness. Two experiments involving a production planning task are reported which 
examine decision makers’ perceptions of the effectiveness of what-if analysis relative to 
the alternatives of unaided decision making, and quantitative decision rules. Experiment 1 
found that almost all subjects believed what-if analysis was superior to unaided decision 
making, although using what-if analysis had no significant effect on performance. 
Experiment 2 found that decision makers were indifferent between what-if analysis and a 
quantitative decision rule which, if used, would have led to significant cost savings. Thus, 
what-if analysis did create an illusion of control: decision makers perceived performance 
differences where none existed, and did not detect large differences when they were present. 
In both experiments, decision makers exhibited difficulty realizing that their positive beliefs 
about what-if analysis were exaggerated. Such misjudgments could lead people to continue 
using what-if analysis even when it is not beneficial and to avoid potentially superior 
decision support technologies. 
Subject Areas: Decision Support Systems and Production/Operations Management. 
INTRODUCTION 
What-if analysis has long been among the most widely used capabilities of computer- 
based decision support systems [4] [31] [47]. What-if analysis is a method for 
manipulating a quantitative model of a business situation in which decision makers 
specify alternative values of decision variables and environmental assumptions, and 
the computer solves the model and displays predicted results. Numerous computer 
programs, including IFPS and Lotus 1-2-3, are available for creating business 
models and interrogating them via what-if analysis (see [48]). 
Despite this popularity, research to date on the effectiveness of what-if analysis, 
and decision support systems in general, has produced mixed results (see [7] and 
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[46]). Researchers have often been unable to find any performance differences 
between assisted and unassisted decision making (e.g., [3] [21] [23]). Significant 
DSS effects, when found, have sometimes been positive [6] [8] [22] [40] [46], and 
sometimes negative [lo] 1351 [361. 
Why is what-if analysis so popular when research has been unable to demonstrate 
consistent advantages? Do decision makers overestimate the effectiveness of what- 
if analysis? As discussed in [l], and demonstrated in the context of information 
reporting systems [15], real and perceived performance impacts of decision support 
may differ. This research examines whether what-if analysis gives people the illusion 
that it helps their decision performance more than it really does. Such an illusion 
would have troubling implications in light of research linking user acceptance of 
computer tools to users’ beliefs about how much the tools improve performance 
[ll] [ 121. If users overestimate their decision performance using what-if analysis, 
they may unintentionally degrade their own performance by using ineffective tools 
or avoiding alternative tools that may well be more effective than what-if analysis. 
What-if Analysis and the Illusion of Control 
We hypothesize that what-if analysis leads to an illusion of control, defined by 
Langer [37] as a person’s expectation of success on a task that is inappropriately 
higher than objective circumstances warrant. In general, an illusion of control tends 
to occur when factors ordinarily associated with increased performance in skill 
situations, including “exerting effort while actively engaged in the task” [37, p. 3131, 
are introduced into situations at least partially determined by chance. Other research 
supports the effort-confidence link [42] [50]. By allowing decision makers to 
manipulate decision variables and assumptions in a model, and observe their effects 
on predicted outcomes, what-if analysis increases the degree of active involvement 
in the decision task relative to unaided decision malung. As Langer points out, “In 
skill situations, the more one actively participates in the event, the more control 
one has over the outcome. Hence it is predicted that the greater one’s active 
involvement in a chance event, the greater the illusion of control” [37, p. 3181. 
Langer and Roth [39] also found that active involvement in a purely chance task 
inflated subjects’ sense of control over outcomes. Although these experiments were 
done in situations where outcomes are completely determined by chance, such as 
lotteries and coin flips, Langer argues that the illusion of control should be even 
greater in situations that are partially controllable due to the increased plausibility 
of attributing performance to skill factors [37]. 
Forecasting and planning activities fit the kind of situation in which Langer 
would predict the occurrence of the illusion of control [27]. That is, decision 
makers generally have only partial control over the environment, but engage in 
cognitive activity with the purpose of increasing control. The present research is 
concerned with the broad category of routine decision making under uncertainty, 
specifically examining a simulated multi-period production scheduling task. Outcomes 
in such decision-making environments are partially determined by chance. There- 
fore, we expect the additional cognitive effort associated with what-if analysis to 
generate an illusion of control. In Experiment 1, we compare what-if analysis to 
unaided decision making, hypothesizing that people will systematically overesti- 
mate the advantage of what-if analysis. 
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What-if Analysis Versus Quantitative Decision Rules 
If what-if analysis creates an illusion of control, as we suggest, then it may cause 
people to overestimate the effectiveness of what-if relative to non-interactive, quan- 
titative decision rules. Quantitative decision rules are an alternate form of decision 
support, quite different in spirit from what-if analysis. For several decades, it has 
been shown that a wide variety of such rules are generally superior to unaided 
decision making (for an extensive review, see [32]). Examples include linear statistical 
models [13] [14] [41], bootstrap models [9], linear decision rules [29], unit weighting 
schemes [13] [18], and simple mechanical decision criteria [5] [44], which have 
proven effective in such diverse contexts as medical diagnosis, graduate admissions, 
auditing, marketing, law, finance, and production planning. 
A major reason for the effectiveness of decision rules is that they reduce the 
inconsistency present in unaided decision making, while bringing relevant information 
to bear on the decision [9] [13] [32]. Despite their proven effectiveness, however, 
decision makers have been reluctant to use decision rules. One explanation for this 
reluctance, given by Dawes 1131, is cognitive conceit: the illusion that the environment 
is more predictable than it really is and that greater cognitive effort will lead to 
better predictions than those afforded by linear models known to be imperfect. This 
explanation parallels the illusion of control concept described by Langer [37] by 
linking active involvement (effort) to perceptions of improved performance. 
How will people judge the effectiveness of decision rules in comparison to 
what-if analysis? Since decision rules generate recommendations via nonjudgmental, 
mathematical, statistical, or mechanical means [32], their use involves less active 
involvement than does what-if analysis, putting the decision maker in a more 
passive role. In Experiment 2, we hypothesize that, due to the illusion of control 
created by what-if analysis, people will overestimate the effectiveness of what-if 
relative to a quantitative decision rule which, if used, would generate significant 
performance advantages. 
One known determinant of user acceptance of decision rules is the way they 
are described to the decision maker. Arkes, Dawes, and Christensen [5] found that 
people became more likely to use a decision rule if they were warned beforehand 
that trying to beat the rule would lead to worse performance. Similarly, Powell [44] 
found that increasing the reported accuracy of a decision rule (50 percent versus 
70 percent versus 90 percent) had a significant effect on peoples’ willingness to 
use it. In Experiment 2, we present the decision rule in two different ways: neutral 
versus 90 percent accuracy. 
Learning from Experience 
Will people learn from experience? If the illusion of control phenomenon is temporary, 
disappearing as decision makers gain experience in the task environment, the 
resulting problems of dysfunctional adoption (or rejection) of decision tools would 
correct themselves over time. However, there are theoretical reasons to expect that 
the illusion of control will not diminish with experience. As Einhorn and Hogarth 
[19, p. 3951 state, “in real-world situations, judgments are made for the purpose 
of choosing between actions. This means that outcome information, which is avail- 
able only after actions are taken, is frequently the only source of feedback with 
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which to compare judgment” (see also [17] [20]). In the present context, people 
judge the effectiveness of what-if analysis as a basis for deciding whether or not 
to use it in preference to alternatives such as unaided decision making or quantitative 
decision rules. Operating under the illusion that what-if is superior to its alternatives, 
decision makers are apt to use what-if analysis to the exclusion of its alternatives, 
thus failing to generate the feedback needed to disconfirm their erroneous beliefs. 
We investigate both the typical situation, in which decision makers have only 
the evidence generated by their own actions as a basis for confirming or disconfiiing 
their beliefs, and the less typical situation, in which outcome feedback regarding 
actions not taken is provided explicitly. In both Experiment 1 and 2 we expect that, 
when people are not provided outcome feedback, their inflated beliefs about what-if 
will persist over time. In both experiments, we also examine whether introducing 
explicit outcome feedback that would ordinarily not be available to decision makers 
will mitigate the illusion of control surrounding what-if analysis. 
EXPERIMENT 1: WHAT-IF ANALYSIS VERSUS UNAIDED 
DECISION MAKING 
Experiment 1 was designed to approximate the real life situation in which a decision 
maker accustomed to making unaided decisions is offered the use of what-if analysis 
on a trial basis, and then forms an opinion about the effectiveness of what-if. 
Subjects made unaided decisions within a 24-period production planning simulation. 
After witnessing their decision performance unaided, subjects were given an inter- 
active, what-if model for four periods of trial use. After trial use, subjects were 
asked their beliefs about their performance with, versus without, the use of what-if 
analysis. Next, subjects used what-if for a full 24-period simulation, and then were 
asked again how effective they think it is relative to unaided decision making. The 
first round of questioning occurred before outcome feedback (results of actually 
using what-if over 24-periods), the second round after outcome feedback. To rule 
out order effects, a second group received the treatments in reverse order: first they 
used the what-if model for the first 24-periods; tried four practice periods unaided; 
reported their beliefs about the effectiveness of what-if (before outcome feedback); 
completed 24 periods unaided, and again reported their beliefs (after outcome 
feedback). 
H1: Based on prior research using a similar task, we expect no performance 
advantages due to the use of what-if analysis compared to unaided decision 
making [35] [36]. 
H2: However, due to the illusion of control, we expect subjects to believe that 
what-if analysis is superior to unaided decision making. 
H3: We expect that outcome feedback (i.e., seeing the results of using what-if 
analysis versus unaided decision making over 24-periods) will signifi- 
cantly reduce subjects’ beliefs in the superiority of what-if analysis. 
Method 
Tmk. The experimental task is based on the Holt, Modigliani, Muth, and Simon 
(HMMS) model of the production planning problem (see [28] [29] [35] [36]). In 
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this model, the decision maker faces future demand and must decide upon a pro- 
duction level and a workforce level over a series of periods. The objective is to 
minimize cumulative total costs. The cost function for a given new period is the 
sum of three quadratic cost components [28]: 
Workforce level change cost = 64.3 (current workforce - new workforce)2, 
Worker overtime/idletime cost = .8 (new workforce 5.67 - new production)2, 
Cost for nonoptimal inventory = .02 (current inventory + new production 
- new demand - 320)’, 
Total cost is the sum of the above three component costs. 
These cost components are highly interrelated in that one component can be 
avoided only at the expense of another. For example, if the workforce is set too 
low relative to production, higher worker overtime cost is incurred. In turn, if 
production is set too low relative to demand, inventory outage cost is driven higher. 
The demand trend used in the experiment begins at 2500 units and increases at a 
rate of 50 units per period. This “unadjusted” demand is randomized 200 (uniform 
distribution) units to generate the actual demand. Each subject ‘got a different 
random demand trend drawn from this distribution. 
Appendix A shows the screen layout of the unaided version of the task simulator, 
which was programmed using the Lotus 1-2-3 macro language. The lower lines on 
the screen display the worker productivity index (5.67) and the optimal level at 
which to maintain inventory (320); both remain constant throughout the task. The 
upper right comer displays the current workforce and inventory levels. The upper 
left displays the total cost thus far incurred. The upper middle of the screen displays 
the sales orders for the next three periods. The middle of the screen is used to 
accept subjects’ production and workforce level inputs. For the what-if treatment, 
a spreadsheet what-if function was embedded into the task simulator interface 
(Appendix B). With this function, subjects can simulate any number of scenarios 
per period to assess cost ramifications. They may enter workforce and production 
levels, and have the model calculate resulting costs. Subjects receive the following 
information for each period: the current workforce level, the current inventory 
level, and the next three periods of demand. Subjects enter “G” for “GO” when 
ready to process the decision they have entered for the current period. Users are 
then asked to confirm the “G” before the decision is processed. Upon confirmation, 
the results are computed and displayed. As shown in Appendix C, the display 
includes the new inventory and workforce levels, workforce change cost, worker 
overlidle time cost, inventory over/outage cost, total cost for the period, and the 
updated average total cost thus far incurred. 
Subjects and Procedure. Forty-five managers attending an evening MBA course 
at a large midwestern university participated in Experiment 1, which employed a 
counterbalanced, within-subjects design. Subjects were randomly assigned to one 
of two treatment groups. One group (n=23) performed the 24-period production 
planning task using what-if analysis first and then unaided. The other group (n=22) 
performed the task first unaided and then using what-if analysis. Two days prior 
to the experiment, one of the authors lectured the entire group of subjects on the 
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production planning task. The general nature of the quadratic cost functions was 
explained and illustrated, although subjects were not given the specific coefficients. 
Subjects were told that their objective was to minimize long-run total cost. They 
were told that the purpose of the exercise was to give them the opportunity to learn 
about production planning using a realistic task simulator. They were also told that 
a what-if analysis function would be available, but that it is unknown whether 
what-if analysis is useful in the production scheduling task. 
When the subjects arrived at the computing lab they were given an instruction 
sheet, directed to a personal computer, and given one of two versions of the 
experiment diskette. Subjects were unaware that there were two different versions 
of the diskette. Subjects using the unaided-first diskette: (1) performed four practice 
periods unaided, (2) performed 24 actual periods unaided, (3) performed 4 practice 
periods using what-if analysis, (4) were asked three belief questions before begin- 
ning 24 periods of actual what-if analysis, (5 )  performed 24 actual periods using 
what-if and observing outcome feedback on their performance, and (6) were asked 
the same three belief questions again. Subjects in the what-if-first treatment under- 
took the same basic sequence except that they first performed the task with what-if 
analysis and then without what-if analysis. To make subjects aware of the chance 
element of the task, they were informed that the randomized demand streams for 
the what-if and unaided segments of the task were independently generated from 
a common demand distribution. As an incentive, 20 $10 cash prizes were awarded: 
$10 was awarded to each of the top ten performers using what-if analysis and to 
each of the top ten unaided performers a week after the experiment. Since each 
subject performed the 24-period task both with and without what-if analysis, it was 
possible for subjects to win up to $20. Subjects were allowed up to 2.5 hours to 
complete the task. Most finished in less than two hours (Mean = 1.97, Standard 
Deviation = .26). 
Belief measuremenf. Users’ beliefs regarding the performance benefits due to 
what-if analysis were measured with three items administered by the task simulator: 
1. Compared to unaided decision making, my cost performance is (options 
arranged vertically: (A) Better using the interactive decision model. 
(B) The same with or without the interactive decision model. (C) Worse 
using the interactive decision model). 
Compared to unaided decision making, the use of the interactive decision 
model (Significantly enhances/Does not affect/Significantly degrades) my 
cost performance. The descriptors in parentheses were used to anchor the 
left, center, and right of a horizontal 1-to-7 scale. 
I would be most confident in the production planning task (options arranged 
vertically: (A) If I DID NOT use the interactive decision model. 
(B) Whether or not I used the interactive decision model. (C) If I DID 
use the interactive decision model). 
Each question screen initially highlighted the center (neutral) response and instructed 
subjects to “Highlight your response using the arrow keys. Press the Enter key to 
select your response.” These items were adapted from a more general measure of 
perceived usefulness developed and validated by [ l l ]  and [12], who showed that 
2. 
3. 
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such beliefs are theoretically and empirically linked to people's willingness to use 
computer-based tools in the workplace. The wording of the items were modified 
to be more specific to the decision simulation task and what-if model being studied 
in the present experiment. Multiple questions were used in order to enhance reliability 
and validity. A mixture of 3-point and 7-point scales and horizontal and vertical 
response formats was employed in order to reduce common method variance. 
These three questions were asked twice during the task: before and after 
receiving outcome feedback regarding how much the use of what-if analysis helped 
their performance in this particular situation. At both questioning times the three 
questions were significantly correlated with each other and loaded on a single 
dimension according to principal components analysis (Table I). A three-item 
belief scale was formed by: coding item one from one (A) to three (C); linearly 
transforming item two from a 7-point to a 3-point metric ((X-1)/3)+1); coding item 
three from three (A) to one (C), and then averaging the three items. The resulting 
belief measure can range from one (subject negative toward what-if analysis) to 
three (subject positive toward what-if analysis), and had Cronbach's alpha reliability 
of .84 when asked the first time (prior to full outcome feedback) and .88 the second 
time. Table 2 gives the means and standard deviations for the belief measurements. 
Results 
What-if analysis had no significant effect on actual performance compared to 
unaided decision making, and yet most subjects reported believing what-if to be 
beneficial. As shown in Table 3, mean cost performance was $2.7 million using 
what-if analysis versus $2.9 million unaided (paired-t(44)=.019, n.s.). The standard 
deviations of these means were $6.7 million and $4.8 million, respectively. What-if 
analysis improved cost performance for only 26 out of 45 subjects (58 percent). 
Consistent with the illusion of control hypothesis, subjects overestimated how 
much what-if analysis helped their performance. Table 4 shows the number of 
subjects who felt it had a positive effect, no effect, or a negative effect on their 
performance, for each treatment, and for each of the two times the questionnaire 
was administered. Thirty-nine out of 45 subjects (87 percent) thought their decision 
performance was better using what-if analysis, five indicated no difference, and 
only one thought his or her decision Performance was worse using what-if analysis 
(per belief question 1). Recall that the 3-item belief measure described above was 
scaled so that values could range from one (what-if positive) to three (what-if 
negative), with a neutral midpoint of two. Mean beliefs on this measure (Table 5) 
were significantly less than 2.0 both before (t(44)=-14.178, p < . O O l )  and after 
(t(44)=-8.362, p<.OOl) receiving outcome feedback. 
Did outcome feedback have any effect on the illusion of control? Most subjects 
remained overconfident in what-if analysis even in the face of outcome feedback 
about their aided versus unaided performance: only two of the people who did 
worse using what-if analysis changed their evaluation of its benefit (Table 4). 
Among the 19 subjects who actually performed worse using what-if analysis, there 
was a significant shift away from believing what-if to be beneficial, from a mean 
of 1.23 to 1.55 (Table 5) .  This represents a significant difference from the 1.19 
rating given by the what-if beneficial group (t(43)= 2.383, p <  .05). Nevertheless, 
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Table 1: Correlation and principal component analyses of belief items: Experiment 1. 
Correlationsa Principal Componentb 
Q1 QZ Factor 1 
Before Full Outcome Feedback 
Question 1 .88 
Question 2 .65 .87 
Question 3 .63 .6 1 .86 
Eigenvalue 2.26 
Percentage variance explained 75.3 













aAll correlations were significant at p<.OOl. 
bEigenvalue for second factor was below 1.0 both before (.40) and after (.36) full outcome 
feedback. 
Table 2: Means and standard deviations of user perceptions of what-if effective- 
ness: Experiment 1. 
Standard Cronbach’s 
Mean Deviation Alpha 
Before Full Outcome Feedback 
Question 1 1.18 .49 
Question 2 1.87 1.14 
Question 3 1.16 .42 
Three-Item scale 1.21 .38 .84 
After Outcome Feedback 
Question 1 1.36 .7 1 
Question 2 2.20 1.42 
Question 3 1.27 .58 
Three-Item scale 1.34 .53 .88 
most of these subjects continued to believe in the efficacy of what-if. Given that 
performance outcomes are partly determined by chance, and subjects were made 
aware of this, it is reasonable for these subjects to attribute their particular results 
to random factors, and to believe that what-if might be beneficial over the long 
term. Thus, while outcome feedback did have a significant effect on beliefs, the 
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Table 3: Effect of what-if analysis on actual cost performance: Experiment 1 .  
Mean Cost: What-if analysis $2,675,932 
Unaided $2.873.932 
Paired-t with 44 degrees of freedom=. 109, nonsignificant. 
What-if analysis helped 26 of 45 subjects (58%). 
Table 4: Frequency of belief responses on belief question 1: Experiment 1 
Group 
Before Outcome After Outcome 
Stated Belief Feedback Feedback 
Total sample 1.  What-if positive 39 36 
(n=45) 2. No difference 5 6 
3. What-if negative 1 3 
Subsamples: 
What-if actually 1.  What-if positive 23 
better (n=26) 2. No difference 2 




What-if actually 1.  What-if positive 16 14 
worse (n= 19) 2. No difference 3 3 
3. What-if negative 0 2 
Note: Based on belief item # l .  
Table 5: Mean beliefs about effectiveness of what-if analysis: Experiment 1. 
Subsample 
Total Sample What-if Better What-if Worse 
(n-45) (n=26) (n-19) Difference 
Before outcome 
After outcome 
feedback 1.21 1.19 1.23 Non-significant 
feedback 1.34 1.19 1.55 p < .05 
Note: Based on 3-item scale: 
1 =“What-if Positive” 
2=“No difference” 
3=“What-if Negative” 
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resulting beliefs were still significantly in favor of what-if analysis. Note that even 
this fairly ambiguous outcome feedback would not ordinarily be available to real 
world decision makers who, acting on their beliefs in the superiority of what-if analysis, 
may avoid using unaided decision making enough to assess its relative performance. 
Consistent with the idea that what-if analysis creates an illusion of control 
through more active involvement in the decision task, people took longer using 
what-if than unaided (Wilcoxin signed-rank test, 34/44, p<.Ol). The order of 
within-subject treatment (what-if first versus unaided first) had no effect on what-if 
performance (t(43)=.871, n.s.), unaided perfoxmance (t(43)=.588, n.s.), or performance 
beliefs (t(43)-.974, n.s.). Unaided performance was therefore not significantly 
different before versus after the what-if session (mitigating concerns about whether 
the what-if-first group experienced learning effects that carried over to the unaided 
session) or vice versa. 
In summary, Experiment 1 found that, although what-if analysis had no per- 
formance advantage over unaided decision making, subjects attributed a performance 
advantage to what-if. Full outcome feedback had a limited effect on these beliefs. 
EXPERIMENT 2: WHAT-IF ANALYSIS VERSUS A QUANTITATIVE 
DECISION RULE 
In Experiment 2, decision makers using what-if analysis were given the recom- 
mendations of a quantitative decision rule, described below, which they were free 
to follow or not. Subjects completed 24 periods of the same production simulation 
task using the same what-if model as used in Experiment 1, with no unaided group. 
H4: Because of the illusion of control, we expect decision makers to overestimate 
the value of what-if analysis and to avoid following the recommendations 
of the quantitative decision rule. 
There were two orthogonal between-subjects manipulations. Half of the subjects 
received feedback regarding what their cumulative costs would have been had they 
used the recommendations of the quantitative decision rule exclusively, whereas 
the other half received no such feedback (and thus were more representative of 
real-life decision makers who ordinarily do not receive feedback regarding actions 
not taken). The decision rule was described in two different ways: for half of the 
subjects, the decision rule was discussed in a neutral manner (see below), whereas 
the other half were told the decision rule outperformed decision makers not using 
it about 90 percent of the time. 
H5: We expect full outcome feedback [2] [19] to significantly reduce the 
illusion of control, thus increasing confidence in the decision rule. 
H6: We expect rule description [5] [44] to significantly reduce the illusion of 
control, thus increasing confidence in the decision rule. 
Method 
Tusk. Experiment 2 used the same production scheduling task as Experiment 1. The 
input screen was modified to incorporate the advice of a quantitative decision rule 
(Appendix D), The quantitative decision rule used to generate the recommendations 
shown in Appendix D employs a straightforward moving average of demand to 
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determine production level, and then adjusts workforce to be the number of workers 
needed to produce that level by dividing by the worker productivity index of 5.67: 
Production = .5 demand, + .3 demand,+1 + .2 demand,+* 
- current inventory + safety stock of 320, 
Workforce = Production / worker productivity constant of 5.67. 
The rule was expected to be effective because it tracks demand trends more system- 
atically than decision makers using what-if analysis. Demand growth was increased 
to 100 units per period (as opposed to 50 in Experiment l), with the same starting 
point of 2500 units and randomization of 2200 units, in order to take greater 
advantage of the rule’s tracking capability. Again, each subject got a different 
random demand trend drawn from this distribution. Pretesting the rule using sample 
demand streams confirmed its effectiveness. Thus, we have constructed a situation 
in which a fairly simple decision rule is expected to outperform decision makers 
using what-if analysis, analogous to situations pitting the unaided decision maker 
against simple but effective decision rules, discussed earlier, in order to investigate 
whether the illusion of control caused by what-if analysis, together with the ambiguous 
feedback characteristics of real life decision making, will impede subjects from 
learning that the rule outperforms unaided what-if analysis. 
Subjects and Procedure. Fifty-two daytime MBA students attending an elective 
class on management decision models at a large midwestern university participated 
in Experiment 2. On a five-point question asking personal computer experience, 
with anchor points “Very Little” (l), “Average” (3) and “Extensive” (5 ) ,  mean 
experience of the sample was 3.2, and 98 percent of subjects selected two, three, 
or four. Experiment 2 employed a 2x2 factorial between-subjects design. The two 
manipulations were outcome feedback (year-to-date performance of the decision 
rule versus no feedback) and rule description (neutral versus 90 percent accuracy). 
Feedback was manipulated by including or not including a display of the rule’s 
performance on the results screen of the task simulator (included on example 
screen, Appendix D). The results screen was the same as Appendix C except that 
the feedback group received a report of year-to-date rule performance similar to 
that shown in Appendix D. Rule description was manipulated in the instructions, 
as discussed below. 
Two days before the experiment, one of the authors lectured the entire sample 
of subjects on the production planning task. To reduce hypothesis guessing and 
demand characteristics, subjects were told that the experimenters were interested 
in how much importance decision makers placed on each of the three cost compo- 
nents in arriving at production and workforce decisions. The general nature of the 
quadratic cost functions was explained and illustrated, although subjects were not 
given the specific coefficients. Subjects were told they would be provided the 
advice of a “decision heuristic” which they were free to follow or not. The formulas 
of the quantitative decision rule were presented to subjects in the instructional 
session prior to the experiment as well as in the instructional handout given at the 
beginning of the experiment. The rule was referred to as a “heuristic” in the context 
of the experiment to relate it to the concept of heuristics presented in class, namely, 
a sometimes helpful but not necessarily optimal rule for decision making. 
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When subjects amved at the computing laboratory, they were given an instruction 
sheet, led to a personal computer, and given one of four versions of a diskette 
selected at random. Subjects did not know that there were multiple treatment 
groups. Eleven subjects were assigned to the neutral-descriptionlno-feedback 
group; 12 to the neutral-descriptionlfeedback group; 14 to the 90 percent-accurate/ 
no-feedback group, and 15 to the 90 percent-accurate/feedback group. On the first 
screen of the task simulation, instructions for subjects in the neutral-description 
group said “The heuristic produces good, but rarely optimal, decisions” whereas 
instructions for subjects in the 90 percent-accuracy group said “The heuristic has 
historically outperformed 90 percent of your peers.” As an incentive, $10 cash 
prizes were awarded to each of the top 20 performers a week after the experiment. 
All subjects completed the task within the 1.5 hours allowed. 
Belief measurement. After performing the 24-period simulation, subjects were 
asked questions automatically by the task simulator. For all questions, instructions 
on the screen asked subjects to “Highlight your response using the arrow keys. 
Press the Enter key to select your response.” The first three were filler items 
designed to reinforce the cover story, asking subjects to rate from one to seven how 
important inventory costs, workforce change costs, and overtimelidletime costs 
were in their decision making. The fourth question asked subjects to “Please 
indicate your degree of past experience using personal computers” on a 1-5 scale 
with anchor points: “Very Little” (l), “Average” (3), and “Extensive” (5).  
The next four items measured subjects’ beliefs about the performance advantages 
of using the quantitative decision rule. 
My decision performance was, or would have been, better if I followed 
the heuristic’s recommendations. (Options arranged vertically: (A) Better 
following the heuristic. (B) The same with or without following the heuristic. 
(C) Worse following the heuristic.) 
Compared to not using the heuristic at all, strictly following the heuristic’s 
recommendations would have (on a horizontal 1-7 scale: Significantly 
Improved/Not Affected/Significantly Degraded) my decision performance. 
I would be most confident in my performance in the production planning 
task by (options arranged vertically: (A) Following the heuristic’s recom- 
mendations. (B) Partially following the heuristic’s recommendations. 
(C) Not following the heuristics recommendations). 
Do you think that following the heuristic’s recommendations improved, 
or would have improved, your overall decision performance on this task? 
(Definitely Yes/Neutral/Definitely No) on a horizontal 1-7 scale. 
These items were adapted from a more general measure of perceived usefulness 
developed and validated by [ll] and [12], who showed that such beliefs are theoreti- 
cally and empirically linked to people’s willingness to use computer-based tools in 
the workplace. The wordings of the items were modified to be made more specific 
to the decision simulation task and what-if model being studied in the present 
experiment. Multiple questions were used in order to enhance reliability and validity. 
A. mixture of 3-point and 7-point scales and horizontal and vertical response formats 
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Table 6: Correlation and principal component analyses of belief items: Experiment 1. 
~~~ 
Correlationsa Principal Componentb 
~ - -  














Percentage variance explained 69.4 
~ ~~ 
8All correlations were significant at p< .01. 
bEigenvalue for second factor was below 1.0 (.63). 
The four belief items were significantly correlated and loaded on a single 
dimension according to principal components analysis (Table 6). A 4-item belief 
index was formed by first linearly transforming the two 7-point questions to a 
3-point metric ((X- 1)/3)+1), and then averaging the four belief items. The resulting 
4-item belief scale can range from one (decision rule positive) to three (decision 
rule negative), and had Cronbach’s alpha reliability of .85. Lastly, one question 
asked subjects how much they used the advice from the quantitative decision rule. 
“How often did you follow the heuristic’s recommendation?” on a 1-7 scale with 
anchor points “Not at all” (l), “About half the time” (4), and “All the time” (7). 
Table 7 gives the means and standard deviations for the belief questions and 
self-reported rule use. 
Results 
As expected, the quantitative decision rule, if used, would have led to large perform- 
ance advantages. Also as expected, users overestimated the effectiveness of what-if 
analysis relative to the decision rule. Overall, the average cost of running the 
production operation for 24 periods was $6,599,471 (Table 8). If subjects had 
adhered to the advice offered by the decision rule, their costs would have averaged 
$472,525, for a mean savings of $6,126,945, a substantial improvement (paired- 
r(5 1)=3.810, p <  .001). Despite this vast performance difference, subjects not shown 
the rule’s performance (true of the real-world avoider of such a decision rule) failed 
to detect any performance difference between what-if analysis and the decision 
rule. Beliefs were assessed using the 4-item measure described above which was 
scaled from one (rule positive) to three (rule negative) with a neutral midpoint of 
two. Mean beliefs (Table 9) of subjects not receiving outcome feedback on the 
rule’s performance was 2.1, not significantly different from the neutral midpoint 
(t(24p.7 14, n.s.). Subjects receiving feedback on the performance of the decision 
rule had mean beliefs of 1.5, significantly favoring the decision rule (r(26)=-9.196, 
As expected, feedback on the rule’s performance had a significant effect on 
beliefs about the relative effectiveness of what-if analysis versus the quantitative 
p <  .001). 
70 Perceptions of Decision Support 
Table I :  Means and standard deviations of beliefs and self-reported rule use: 
Experiment 2. 
Standard Ctonbach ’s 
Mean Deviation Alpha 
Beliefs Question 1 1.67 .83 
Question 2 2.90 1.86 
Question 3 2.02 .58 
Question 4 3.12 1.67 
Scale 1.76 .54 .85 
Self-Reported rule use 2.24 1.60 
decision rule. Counter to expectations, rule description (neutral versus 90 percent) 
had no significant effect on either beliefs or performance. The effect of rule feed- 
back and description were assessed by two-way analysis of variance. Outcome 
feedback comparing actual performance to that which would have occurred given 
strict adherence to the decision rule significantly increased subjects’ beliefs in the 
superiority of the decision rule (F(1,48)=8.045, p<.Ol), but had no effect on actual 
performance (F(1,48)=.359, n.s.). Differences in rule description affected neither 
beliefs (F(1,48)=.020, ns.) nor performance (F(1,48)=.064, n.s.). There were no 
interaction effects between feedback and description with respect to either beliefs 
(F( 1,48)=.230, n.s.) or performance (F( 1,48)=. 126, n.s.). Self-reported personal 
computer experience had no effect as a covariate on either beliefs (F( 1,47)=.988, 
n.s.) or performance (F(1,47)=1.095, n.s.), and experience did not differ significantly 
among the four treatment groups (F(2,49)=.812, n.s.). 
Although outcome feedback caused people to significantly revise their beliefs 
about the relative effectiveness of what-if analysis versus the quantitative decision 
rule, this was not accompanied by a shift in rule usage, or resulting performance: 
there was no significant effect of feedback on either performance or self-reported 
rule usage. The self-reported measure of rule usage was unaffected by feedback 
(F(1,48)=.103, n.s.), description (F(1,48)=.559, n.s.), and their interaction 
(F( 1,48)=.444, n.s.). Thus, subjects generally chose not to follow the recommendations 
of the decision rule, irrespective of feedback or description. 
It is surprising that the $4.6 million average cost performance for subjects 
receiving feedback was not significantly lower than the $8.8 million average for 
non-feedback subjects. As in Experiment 1, the standard deviations were quite large 
($9.4 million for feedback subjects and $13.4 for non-feedback subjects). A non- 
parametric test of this difference was performed in case departures from normality 
undermined the power of the F-test, but was also non-significant (Mann-Whitney 
U=291,2=-.85, n.s.). To investigate the reasons for these large standard deviations, 
we examined individual cost trends over the 24 time periods of the simulation for 
each of the three cost components. Although the variety of patterns was great, two 
discernible patterns emerged. Some people were apparently “trackers” who 
quickly discovered that moderate adjustments in workforce or production in the 
short term might help avoid larger, costlier changes in the future as the business 
responds to growing demand. Note that the decision rule is also based on a tracking 
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Table 8: Effect of feedback and description on cost performance: Experiment 2. 
Actual Performance 
Rule Feedbacka 
Rule Descriptionb No Yes Combined 
Neutral 8,128,18 1 5,193,369 6,596,975 
(n= 11) (n- 12) 
90% Accurate 9,322,207 4,062,078 6,60 1,450 
(n= 14) (n= 15) 
Combined 8,796,835 4,564,874 6,599,47 1 
Decision rule performanceC 472,525 
aRule feedback had no significant effect on actual performance. 
bRule description had no significant effect on actual performance. 
’3ecision rule outperformed decision makers using what-if analysis @< .001). 
strategy. Other people, the “myopics,” apparently tried to optimize in the short run 
by avoiding increases in production or workforce, possibly because they believed 
the upward trend may reverse itself. In any case, these people kept short-term costs 
low initially and later incurred spiraling costs in order to satisfy demand. The 
trackers tended to keep costs from going up non-linearly, while the myopics often 
experienced non-linear cost run-ups. This is an example where a seemingly con- 
servative decision strategy, for example, avoiding the hiring of additional staff in 
the short run, has traumatic consequences for the business. There seemed to be a 
mixture of trackers and myopics in every treatment group, hence the high standard 
deviations in cost performance. 
We then investigated whether feedback may have caused some of the subjects 
to switch from a myopic to a tracking strategy (i.e., to behave more like the rule 
even if not adhering to it fully). Trackers tended to incur less than $1 million in 
total costs. Forty-four percent of the feedback subjects incurred less than $1 million 
compared with 32 percent of the non-feedback subjects (x2(1)=.8, n.s.). We also 
looked at degree of rule adherence by calculating the absolute difference between 
the rule’s recommendations and the subject’s choice of workforce and production 
levels, finding no differences across treatment group. This is consistent with self- 
reported rule use, which also found no differences across groups. Thus, the high 
variance seems to be due to individual variations in strategy choice (e.g., tracker 
versus myopic) more so than strategy switching resulting from feedback or rule 
description. People receiving feedback may have been resistant to switching over 
to using the rule midstream in light of the large one-time penalty associated with 
that. That is, the feedback they received showed performance of the decision rule 
if used from the first period, whereas there was no way to get a “clean slate” once 
several decision periods have transpired and the efficacy of the rule becomes 
apparent. This may explain why rule use did not increase with full outcome feed- 
back while perceived efficacy of the rule did. In other words, by the end of the 
game, people may have realized that it would have been much better to use the 
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Table 9: Effect of feedback and description on mean performance beliefs: Experiment 2. 
Rule Feedbacka 
Rule Descriotionb No Yes Combined 
Neutral 2.1 1.6 
90% Accurate 2.1 1.3 




Note: Based on 4-item scale: 
1 -“Positive Toward Decision Rule” 
2-“Neutral Toward Decision Rule” 
3=“Negative Toward Decision Rule” 
“Rule feedback had a significant effect on performance beliefs ( p < . O l ) .  
bRule description had no effect on performance beliefs. 
rule from the outset, even though it may not have been as beneficia. to switch in 
mid-game. This may be an artifact of using a finite simulation in that, over a longer 
time horizon, subjects may have been impelled to incur the switching costs in order 
to take advantage of the highly effective decision rule. 
In summary, decision makers generally did not initially recognize the substantial 
benefits of the quantitative decision rule compared to what-if analysis, chose not 
to follow its recommendations, and therefore incurred costs which were much 
higher than those obtained by the decision rule. This occurred despite the fact that 
the subjects were students in a management science type class, and so might be 
expected to favor OR/heuristic models to other approaches. When decision makers 
were shown how well they would have done by following the decision rule’s 
advice, they shifted their beliefs in favor of the decision rule (as measured at the 
end of the 24-period simulation). This shift in beliefs was not accompanied by a 
change in either rule usage or performance, as neither were significantly affected 
by feedback. Changing the way the rule was described had no effect on either 
beliefs or performance. 
DISCUSSION 
Does what-if analysis create an illusion of control? The present results suggest yes 
(Table 10). Experiment 1 found that people strongly believed that what-if analysis 
was superior to unaided decision making, even though no actual performance differ- 
ence occurred. Experiment 2 found that people generally failed to detect a substantial 
performance advantage of a quantitative decision rule over what-if analysis. In both 
cases, people exaggerated the effectiveness of what-if analysis relative to its alter- 
natives. By promoting more active involvement in the decision-making task, what-if 
analysis appears to inflate decision makers’ sense of how well they perform in the 
production planning task. The illusion of control associated with what-if analysis 
is problematic because it may cause decision makers to use what-if when it doesn’t 
really help, and to prefer what-if over superior decision support technologies. 
Decision makers had difficulty learning from experience that their beliefs 
about what-if were inflated. In Experiment 1, subjects overrated what-if analysis 
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Table 10: Perceived versus actual effectiveness of decision support: Summary of 
findings. 
Experiment 1 
Performance What-If Analysis Unaided Significance 
Perceived Better Worse pc.001 
Actual No difference No difference Non-significance 
Experiment 2 
Performance What-If Analysis Decision Rule Significance 
Perceived No difference No difference Non-significance 
Actual Worse Better pc.001 
even when given the opportunity to witness their own decision performance both 
with and without the use of what-if analysis. In Experiment 2, decision makers did 
not perceive any significant performance difference between what-if analysis and 
the quantitative decision rule unless they were shown explicitly how well the rule 
would have performed if used, information often not available in practice. 
What can be done to minimize the illusion of control due to what-if analysis? 
Exaggerated control beliefs are sometimes adaptive and beneficial [38], leading 
people to seek to exercise greater control in partially controllable circumstances. 
However, if the inflated sense of control associated with what-if analysis causes 
decision makers to avoid superior methods which are readily available, as we 
found, then the consequences are dysfunctional, and methods for reducing the 
perceptual bias should be sought. We addressed two interventions for debiasing: 
providing explicit outcome feedback showing relative performance of alternative 
tools, and changing how decision tools are described to decision makers, Outcome 
feedback was only partially effective: in Experiment 1 it did not overcome the 
illusion of control, while in Experiment 2 it did. Probably the large size of the 
difference between what-if and rule performance in Experiment 2 explained why 
outcome feedback was effective there only. In contrast to Powell’s [44] finding, 
changing the way in which the decision rule was described (in our case from neutral 
to 90 percent accurate) did not significantly influence beliefs or behavior with 
respect to the decision rule in Experiment 2. Thus, more research is needed to 
identify interventions that would be effective in reducing the illusion of control. 
One interesting finding of the present research is that greater cognitive effort, 
in the form of what-if analysis, did not pay off in terms of improved decision 
making. In Experiment 1, users of what-if analysis took significantly longer to 
make their decisions, with no significant performance gain. In Experiment 2 people 
used what-if instead of a much more effective decision rule which would have been 
nearly effortless to employ. Research in other contexts has similarly demonstrated 
limitations in the effort-performance link, and shown that cognitively simple decision 
rules often perform quite well [24] [26] [30] [33] [34] [49]. Computer-augmented 
or not, cognitive effort has only limited capability for generating performance 
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improvements in task environments partially governed by uncontrollable factors, 
true of many real life situations. 
Will our results generalize to other situations? One possible limitation relates 
to our use of MBA students. In an earlier study using this production planning task, 
no significant differences were found between MBA’s and managers, although 
neither group had work experience as production planners [45]. Also, in Experiment 1, 
all participants were evening students employed full time. A second limitation 
concerns the extent to which the production planning task is representative of 
real-world decision making. While recognizing that differences do exist, the basic 
nature of the task-recuning decisions under uncertainty-is characteristic of 
many domains: maintaining an investment portfolio over time, periodic planning, 
budgeting, medical diagnosis, and others [25] [33] [34]. A third limitation concerns 
the extent to which the findings will generalize to tasks beyond the class of recurring 
decisions under uncertainty. Suggesting that the illusion of control may indeed 
generalize, Pentland’s [43] field study of 11 10 Internal Revenue Service accountants 
found that they believed using personal computers was superior to manual methods 
although such use did not improve performance. These considerations increase 
confidence in our findings, although additional research is needed to verify the 
existence of the illusion of control, to gauge its prevalence, and to better understand 
its nature, contingencies, determinants, and remedies. 
The present findings have practical implications for designers and users of 
decision support systems. Many design techniques emphasize guiding the design 
process according to user perceptions and preferences. While such a practice is 
important from the standpoint of increasing the chances for user acceptance, since 
users are more apt to accept tools they believe are effective [ l l ]  [12], possible 
discrepancies between perceived and actual performance imply that resulting tools, 
though accepted, may in some cases actually be ineffective or even dysfunctional 
(see, [l] [15] [35]). For example, although it is commonly believed that “greater 
flexibility and choice in software aids will promote improved user performance,” 
system-guided model manipulation significantly improved performance compared to 
user-guided manipulation [16, p. 4611. Designers should be cautious when designing 
according to user preferences, and should seek independent confirmation of the 
efficacy of user-preferred designs. Our findings suggest paying particular attention 
to decision support techniques that increase active involvement in the decision task, 
which are especially susceptible to the illusion of control. Thus, this research raises 
several important questions for future research. We need to gain a better understanding 
of how pervasive the illusion of control is in DSS contexts, what its ramifications 
are, and how to manage it. [Received: June 9, 1992. Accepted: November 17, 1993.1 
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Appendix A: Unaided input screen: Experiment 1. 
T o t a l  Cost  To Date 43677 Current  Inventory 173 
Current  Workforce 440 
Period 4 5 6 
S a l e s  2523 2699 2710 
Uni ts  t o  Produce 2976 
Workforce Level 490 
Worker P r o d u c t i v i t y  is 5.67 u n i t s  p e r  worker 
The Optimal Level of Inventory is 320 
Type G t o  Go with c u r r e n t  d e c i s i o n  
<--- Input 
C e l l s  <--- 
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Appendix B: What-if analysis input screen: Experiment 1. 
T o t a l  Cost TO Date 396226 Current  Inventory 14 
C u r r e n t  Workforce 525 
Period 9 1 0  11 
Sales  3419 3572 3581 
u n i t s  t o  Produce 3419 3572 3575 <---Input 
Workforce Level 550 555 560 <---Cells 
14 14 8 <--- Ending Inventory 
Workforce Level Change Cost 40188 1608 1608 <--Simulated 
Worker Over/Idle  T i m e  Cost 72270 144602 127872 <--Results 
Non-Optimal Inventory Cost 1873 1873 1947 <--- 
Total  Cost 114301 148083 131427 <--- 
Worker Product iv i ty  i s  5.67 u n i t s  p e r  worker 
T h e  Optimal Level of Inventory  is 320 
Type G t o  Go with c u r r e n t  d e c i s i o n  
Appendix C: Results screen: Experiment 1. 
T o t a l  Cost To' Date 222785 Current  Inventory 253 
Current  Workforce 451 
Period 3 
S a l e s  2834 
Uni ts  t o  Produce 2834 
Workforce Level 451 
Ending Inventory 253 
Worker Over / Id le  Time Cost 61308 
Tota l  Cost 61398 
Workforce Level Change Cost 0 
Non-Optimal Inventory Cost 90 
Worker P r o d u c t i v i t y  i s  5.67 u n i t s  p e r  worker 
The Optimal Level of Inventory  i s  320 
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Appendix D: Input screen: Experiment 2. 
Your Total Cost: 37368 Current Inventory 256 
What Heuristic: 26940 Current Workforce 483 
would have done 
Period 4 5 6 
Heuristic’s Sales 2883 2994 3131 
Recommendation 
2869 Produce 2869 2994 3000 <---Input 
506 Employ 506 515 530 <---Cells 
242 Ending Inventory 242 242 111 <--- 
122 Inventory S 122 122 8 1 4  <---  
34015 Hire/Layoff S 34015 5208 14468 <--Simulated 
0 Over/Idletime S 0 4375 21 <--Results 
34137 Total Cost S 34137 9705 15363 <--- 
Worker Productivity is 5.67 units per worker 
The Optimal Level of Inventory is 320 
Type G to Go with current decision 
Note: Display of “What Heuristic would have done” was provided only to subjects in the 
outcome feedback condition. 
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